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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
116. The protest of the passenger for slower speed may not be sufficient
to entitle him to this protection. Wachtel v. Bloch (1931) 43 Ga. App.
756, 160 S. E. 97. In Massachusetts in cases when death has resulted the
rule of ordinary care is applied by statute. Gallup v. Lazatt (1930) 271
Mass. 406, 171 N. E. 658. It is difficult to find convincing reasons for the
proposition that while the plaintiff is a member of the general public, the
driver owes him the duty of ordinary care, but upon entering the automo-
bile, the driver's duty immediately shifts to that of slight care. One
justification urged has been that the guest is favored. Although the argu-
ment may be forceful when applied to this type of case, such a conclusion
is not applicable where the relationship is for the benefit and convenience
of the driver or their mutual benefit. See White, The Liability of an
Automobile Driver to a Non-paying Passenger (1912), 18 Va. L. R. 342,
et seq. It will not do to say that the driver owes no more duty to the
guest than a gratuitous bailee owes to a block of wood. Munson v. Rupker,
supra.
J. L. A. '37.
CONTRACTS-FUTURE INSTALLIVIENTS-ECLARATORY JUDGMENTS.-In an
action on an accident insurance policy providing for monthly installments
to the insured during total disability, plaintiff seeks to recover accrued
installments to the commencement of his action, installments accruing be-
tween the commencement of the action and the trial, and to be granted a
declaratory judgment as to installments as they come due in the future.
The lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff on all three grounds. Held,
on appeal, plaintiff is entitled to installments accrued at the commence-
ment of his action and to those accruing between the commencement of the
action and the trial, but he cannot recover, by resort to a declaratory relief
statute, installments due in the future. Brix v. Peoples Mu&ual Life In-
surance Co. (Calif. Sup. Feb. 20, 1935). 41 Pac. (2nd) 537.
Authority as to the right to judgments for future installments under
such an insurance policy is conflicting. In some jurisdictions, notably
Kentucky, they have been granted without the invocation of declaratory
relief statutes; usually contingent upon the continuation of the insured's
disability. Prudential Life Insurance Co. of America v. Hampton (1933)
252 Ky. 145, 65 S. W. (2nd) 980; Equitable Life Insurance Society of the
United States v. Branham (1933) 250 Ky. 472, 63 S. W. (2nd) 498.
Where the insurer has clearly indicated his intention not to perform in
the future the majority of states permit an action for breach of the en-
tire contract. Lovell v. St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Go. (1884) 111
U. S. 264; McKee v. Phoenix Life Insurance Co. (1859) 28 Mo. 383;
Indiana Life Endowment Co. v. Carnithan (1915) 62 Ind. App. 567,
109 N. E. 851; Freeman, On Judgments (5th Ed. 1925), Vol. 3, pp. 2780-
2792; Williston on Contracts (1920), Vol. 3, Sec. 1328. In the absence of
such repudiation by the insurer, the general rule is that recovery may be
had only for accrued installments. Green v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Go. of
Cincinnati. (1932) 203 N. C. 767, 167 S. E. 38; Mid-Continent Life
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Insurance Co. v. Christian (1932) 164 Ok. 161, 23 Pac. (2nd) 672;
Robinson v. Exempt Fire Co. of San Francisco (1894) 103 Cal. 1, 36
Pac. 955; Bonslett -v. New York Life Insurance Co. (Mo. 1916) 190 S.
W. 870. And in a few jurisdictions there may be no recovery for future
installments even though the insurer has repudiated the contract. Porter
v. Supreme Council (1903) 183 Mass. 326, 67 N. E. 238; Freeman, On
Judgments, supra. One reason for the courts' refusal to grant judgments
for future damages under this type of contract has been the difficulty of
accurately assessing damages. Allen v. National Life and Accident In-
surance Co. (Mo. 1934) 67 S. W. (2nd) 534; Chipley v. National Life
and Accident Insurance Co. (Mo. 1934) 67 S. W. (2nd) 992. The use of
mortality tables has occasionally been justified. Federal Life Insurance
Co. v. Rascoe (C. C. A. 6, 1926) 12 Fed. (2nd) 693.
Declaratory Judgment Acts, where they have been adopted, usually
contain a clause which makes them applicable to contracts. The Cali-
fornia statute, while not that recommended by the Commissioners on
Uniform State Law, is not dissimilar in its implications in the instant case.
California Code of Civil Procedure of 1923, sec. 1060. The Uniform Act
and current trends in the declaratory judgment movement are discussed by
E. M. Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment in the United States (1931),
37 W. Va. Law Quarterly 127. Included in the California laws is a
statute making the granting of declaratory relief discretionary in the
court. Calif. Code Civil Pro., supra, sec. 1061. No authority is found for
the application of declaratory judgment statutes to future installment pay-
ments under disability insurance contracts.
Green v. Inter-Ocean Cas. Co., supra, held that they must be refused
because declaratory relief can be granted only where damages in the fu-
ture are the proximate result of the tort or breach of contract on which
the action was based. In Brix v. Peoples Mutual there was no breach of
the contract in its entirety. Declaratory judgments have been refused in
one great class of cases, including to some extent the instant case, where
the rights of the parties are future, contingent, or uncertain. Dobson v.
Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp. (1933) 124 Neb. 652, 247 N. W.
789; Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore (1930) 249 Mich. 673,
229 N. W. 618.
The decision of the instant ease is thus backed by the weight of author-
ity as to its refusal to grant declaratory relief where the rights of parties
are in some degree contingent, but, in the dicta of the court, there is a
hint as to a possible future role of the Declaratory Judgment Act in such
cases. The court grants the plaintiff a judgment for installments accru-
ing between the commencement of the action and the actual trial on the
ground that refusal would not be in harmony with modern procedure,
which seeks to enable parties to settle in a single action all controversies
growing out of the same subject matter. The determination of the par-
ties' rights as to future installments, contingent upon the continuation of
the plaintiff's total disability, would be another step in this direction. The
tendency is toward a more liberal interpretation of the scope of the ap-
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plicability of declaratory relief. Sigal v. Wise (1932) 114 Conn. 297,
158 At]. 891. In that case it was said that one great purpose of the
acts is to enable parties to settle their differences in advance of any in-
vasion of rights so as to avoid the expense and disturbance of lawsuits.
. . . "Fully to carry out" these purposes "it is sometimes necessary to
determine rights which will arise or become complete only in the con-
tingency of some future happening." In Post v. Metropolitan Life In-
surance Co. (1929) 237 N. Y. Supp. 64, it was said that the Declaratory
Judgment Statute "was designed to supply the need for a form of action
that would set controversies at rest before they led to the repudiation of
obligations, the invasion of rights, and the commission of wrongs. The
benevolent purposes of the statute should not be thwarted by narrow and
technical construction."
J. W. '37.
EvMENCF-MOTION PIcTunsS.-The plaintiff sued for damages for in-
juries to his nervous system, claiming total and permanent disability, and
his physician testified that the plaintiff's condition "will get progressively
worse" and "will manifest more organic signs as time progresses." Defend-
ant introduced motion pictures taken while plaintiff was'unaware, showing
him doing various chores, including taking down a cherry tree ten feet high.
This evidence was held admissible to prove the complete manual dexterity
of the plaintiff and the likelihood of his speedy rehabilitation. Smalley v.
New York Central Ry. Co. (D. C., E. D. N. Y., No. L-6235, Feb. 11, 1935)
U. S. Law Week, Feb. 26, 1935, p. 14.
During the earlier development of motion pictures the courts hesitated
to recognize their validity as evidence. The first New York case was Gibson
v. Gunn (1923) 202 N. Y. Supp. 19, a suit by a dancer for personal in-
juries. As the defendant, in order to prove that the actual damage he had
caused was slight, relied upon the fact that before the accident the plaintiff's
leg had been amputated, the plaintiff showed a motion picture, portraying
her in various dances, proving that in spite of her artificial leg she had been
an expert dancer before her injury by the defendant. The appellate court
held such evidence inadmissible for the reasons that motion pictures in them-
selves present fertile field for exaggeration of one's emotions and actions,
that plaintiff had offered no evidence as to how this picture had been pre-
pared, and that the evidence was irrelevant and hearsay. Thus, under
the first reason given, it would seem that all motion pictures must be ex-
cluded, a view limited by later decisions. Despite the court's unsupported
statement to the contrary, it appears clear that the evidence was neither
irrelevant nor hearsay.
Later cases excluding motion pictures as evidence based their decisions
on grounds not in conflict with Smalley v. N. Y. Gent. By., supra. In Mas-
sachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Worthy, (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 9 S. W.
(2nd) 388, an action on an insurance policy, the court sustained exclusion
of motion pictures disproving plaintiff's claim of total disability, for the
reason that the defendant had failed to identify them or verify their ac-
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